Contrary to previous studies, we find that the Court matches a greater cohesion of the other government branches with more independent behavior, improving the effectiveness of the system of checks and balances.
the most relevant determinants of structural independence i ndicated in Padovano, Sgarra and The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 illustrates the structure and the decision making procedures of the Italian Constitutional Court. In Section 4.1 we describe the variables pertinent to the empirical restrictions emerged from the theoretical literature. We then present the results of estimates on both sentence-based and annual data. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks. Landes and Posner (1975) is the first positive analysis of the determinants of the independence of the supreme or constitutional courts. Starting from an interest-group model of government, they argue that an independent judiciary is an ins titutional mechanism aimed at increasing the durability of enacted legislation. Since the present value of legislative "deals" between legislators and interest groups is positively correlated with the durability of such deals, legislators have an ex ante interest to grant independence to judges. They may do so by extending the length of judges' tenure and by insulating their selection and incomes from political interferences. Landes and Posner start their argument from the observed fact that independent jud ges tend to interpret laws in terms of the intent of the enacting legislature, rather than the current one, and thus rarely nullify or declare laws unconstitutional. The durability and present value of legislative deals increase because, even when the enacting legislators end their tenure, their legislative acts outlive them due to the Court's consideration of their original intent. The main testable restriction of models such as Landes and Posner (1975) applied to supreme or constitutional courts is that the independence of these courts is positively correlated with the durability of the legislative contracts. When the court is relatively dependent, the durability of the standing legislation will be relatively low; consequently, on average there will be a relatively short time between the enactment of the law about which the court renders a sentence of constitutional illegitimacy and the sentence itself. On the other hand, if the court is relatively independent, the durability of the standing legislation will be higher. Therefore, the longer the time elapsed between the enactment of the law and the ruling of the court, the greater the independence of the Court.
The sources of judiciary independence: review of the literature
In a wide variety of context and samples Anderson, Shugart and Tollison (1989) , Spiller and Gely (1992) , Boudreaux and Pritchard (1994) , Gorini and Visco Comandini (1998) find evidence in support of Landes and Posner's model, as well as other theories of the same vein, such as Crain and Tollison (1979) and Salzberger (1993) .
The most relevant shortcoming of the interest groups models of judicial behavior is their failure to explain how the independence of the judicial power arises from -or is limited by -the interactions ("checks and balances" in the jargon of constitutional theories) between the jud iciary and the other two government branches, the legislative and the executive. The model of Landes and Posner (1975) features two agents only, the Supreme Court and the legislative; but the very fact that it is the President of the Court to appoint the justices and that he does so in order to influence future legislation shows that the relationship between the executive and the legislative does affect the functioning of the Court. Analyses of this relationship have recently become possible thanks to the development of the political economics models on the separation of powers and political accountability. Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997) is the seminal paper in this field; yet they consider only two government branches -the legislative and the executive -and treat the judiciary as a silent partner. Padovano, Sgarra e Fiorino (2003) extend the logic of Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997) and elaborate a theory of how judicial independence enhances political accountability and assures the functioning of the system of checks and balances. The basic idea is that, in presidential democracies, an independent judicial branch uses its information advantage with respect to voters in order to force the government to keep the extraction of rents (or the preserva tion of information) below the level ensured by the electoral control; whereas in parliamentary democracies the independent judiciary makes the collusive agreements between the executive and the legislative unstable, again favoring the electorate. An accommodating judiciary, instead, merely participates to the sharing of the rents. The authors relate judicial independence to the possibility for the legislative and executive branches to affect the selection and the career paths of judges. The lower such a possibility, the higher is the independence of the judiciary. When applied to constitutional courts, this model predicts that a relatively more independent court, in the way described above, will be more likely to rule against the constitutional legitimacy of legislative acts approved by the other two government branches.
In their analyses of, respectively, the English Courts of Appeal and the Israeli Supreme Court Salzberger and Fenn (1999) and Salzberger (2003) offer empirical support to predictions akin t o those of Padovano, Fiorino and Sgarra (2003) . They find that the courts' rulings are affected both by the features that secure the independence of individual judges and the characteristics of the institutional framework in which the courts operate. Among the elements of individual independence rigid arrangements regarding tenure, immunity from wage decreases and judges' age turn out to be the most significant; whereas the presence of special procedures for the appointment and the promotion of judges, and the mechanism for the allocation of cases to judges are the institutional characteristics that carry the greatest explanatory power. As regards to the Italian case, Breton and Fraschini (2003) affirm that the Italian Constitutional Court is as independent as any other corresponding court of democratic countries. They base such assertion by reporting the jobs that the Presidents and the Vice-presidents of the Court took after the end of their tenure and evaluating their "political" nature; yet they do not provide any statistical test for their claim.
In Tsebelis (2000 Tsebelis ( , 2001 ) the behavior of the judiciary is dependent on the policymaking of the "veto players". This term refers to the political agents who must jointly agree in order to implement a legislative act. When applied to legislative production (Tsebelis 2001) , the veto players model foresees a sequential game in two steps. Given a legislative status quo that results from an agreement between the legislative veto players (depending on the institutional setting, they may in turn be the executive and the legislative branches, or the political parties, or the like) the Court decides whether to modify the status quo through a sentence of constitutional (il)legitimacy. If the Court acts with a sentence that falls within the Pareto set of the legislative veto players, the game ends. If, instead, the decision of the Court lies outside the Pareto set, the players modify the outcome of the Court's decision by agreeing about a new proposal that changes the legislative status quo. In this model the Court essentially holds a passive role, with a low checks and balance potential, since the probability that the Court's decision may be the end of the game is conditional to the size of the Pareto set of the legislative veto players. Thus, the higher the number of the legislative veto players or the wider the ideological distance that separates them, the larger is the Pareto set and the higher is the probability of an overthrowing of the legislative status quo by the Court. The impossibility for legislative veto players to change the status quo may lead justices to be more active and independent from the other political bodies. According to this model, we should observe a higher percentage of sentences of constitutional illegitimacy when the fragmentation and/or the ideological polarization of the legislative veto players increase. Santoni and Zucchini (2001) test the theory of Tsebelis (2001) on data drawn from the Italian institutional and political framework and focus especially on the relationship between the Parliament and the Constitutional Court. Their main findings are twofold: first of all, they provide evidence that the introduction of the Court in 1956 is correlated with lower legislative output and lo wer likelihood of policy changes -a fact, however, which can also be explained by the nearly absolute majority of parliamentary seats held by the Christian Democrats during the first two legislatures, which end more or less at the same time. Second, Santoni and Zucchini (2001) show that the level of intervention by the Court, used as a proxy of judicial independence, is an increasing function both of the number of veto players (political parties) in the Italian Parliament and of their ideological differences. The most evident theoretical shortcoming of their analysis is that they define judiciary independence as a function only of the effective number of parties in the Parliament and of the power game played among them. This is at best an indirect way to catch such independence, as it is not based on structural characteristics of the Court independence, such as tenure length, methods of appointment of the justices, justices' age and the like. As we shall see, these characteristics are not constant through time. At the empirical level, Santoni and Zucchini (2001) test the veto players model in isolation, without comparing its predictions with those of alternative, competing models of judicial independence. This makes it impossible to evaluate the relative explanatory power of the veto players model and exposes their findings to the risk of observational equivalence with the predictions of other theories. Furthermore, the jurisprudence of the Italian Constitutional Court has not been stable, having been affected by exogenous phenomena such as the need to focus on pre-Republican legislation, cases of impeachment of ministers and the need to absorb the backload of cases in different periods of its activity. A more correct empirical analysis should consider a greater set of theoretical contributions and pay attention to the stability of the relationships through time.
While not testing it directly, still the empirical analyses of Ramseyer and Rasmusen (1997) and Hanssen (2002) are related to the logics underlying the veto players model. In particular, Ramseyer and Rasmusen (1997) stress the importance of the stability of the veto players as determined by the degree of competitiveness in the electoral market. By comparing the Japanese and the American political systems, they argue that judicial independence arises from high political turnover. If a party expects to stay in power for several consecutive legislative terms, it will eventually obtain close control over judicial agents. Conversely, where politicians face competitive electoral markets and a high likelihood of government turnover, judges will be relatively more insulated from political pressures. In the same vein, Hanssen (2002) examines the judicial selection and retention procedures in all the American states. He shows that the most independent judicial institutions are associated with higher levels of political competition and greater differences between political platforms.
Hayo and Voigt (2003) and Feld and Voigt (2003a, 2003b) This review of the literature suggests that a fruitful line of empirical research on judicial independence must satisfy two conditions: first, it must pay attention to the institutional details of the jurisprudence of the court, by focusing on formal and substantial provisions of independence and the effects of changes thereof on the behavior of the court itself; second, it must compare the predictions of alternative theories of judicial independence. In order to satisfy the first condition, a single country sample seems more appropriate than a cross country one. The aim of this paper is to advance on both dimensions, using data about the Italian Constitutional Court. A qualified majority of two-thirds of the total membership of the two Houses is instead required for the judges elected by the Parliament. After three ballots this qualified majority is reduced to three-fifths of the total. During the so-called first Republic (1948 Republic ( -1993 the presence of such a high quorum induced the main parties to reach an informal agreement for the election of the judges. On the basis of such an agreement two candidates were usually chosen by the Christian Democratic Party (DC), one by the Communist party (PCI), one by the Socialist party (PSI) and another one by the smaller parties (Rodotà, 1999) . The introduction of the majority system in the election of the Parliament in 1993 modified the Italian political framework. The result was the creation of two coalitions and, as regards to the election of constitutional judges, meant the disappearance of the informal agreement. Yet, an agreement between the governing and the opposing coalition is still needed, as the majority usually finds it difficult to elect five judges without the support of the opposition.
A closer look at the Italian Constitutional Court
As for the five judges appointed by the President of the Republic, constitutional theorists (Zagrebelsky, 1997) In order to guarantee the independence of the Court, the Italian law establishes a number of requirements, in addition to the procedures that regulate their election and appointment. For instance, Constitutional judges cannot be members either of the Parliament, or of the Regional Councils; they cannot exercise professional, commercial or industrial activities or be managers or number of the judges that have to be elected in every court; hence it is equal to six in the Court of Cassation and to two in the Court of Audit and the Council of State.
auditors of profit corporations. Finally, they cannot work as magistrates or university professors or participate to the activities of political parties.
3.2. Decision making process of the Court. It is the details of the procedures through which the Court in fact reaches its decisions where we must look into in order to understand the changing degrees and the actual sources of structural independence of the Constitutional Court. First, the 15 justices elect a President among themselves who holds office for a 3-year term and can be reappointed. The President holds a significant agenda setting power: he sets the agenda of the cases to be reviewed, selects the "judge reporter" whose task is to prepare the first draft of each sentence and holds a double voting weight in case of ties.
Another important driving feature of the Court's decision making process is the so-called Since it is the President to allocate the cases to the various members of the Court and to appoint the judge reporter for the different cases, his influence will be substantially greater than that of the other Court members. As Feld and Voigt (2003) put it, "… in such an institutional environment, it could be interesting to try to "buy" just the chief justice" (Feld and Voigt, 2003, p.8) 4 .
In order to capture the implication of the theory of Landes and Posner (1975) , we measure the durability of the legislative acts that undergo the review of the Court as the square of the number of days elapsed between the date of the promulgation of the law and the date of appointment as justice of the President of the Court who was sitting for the sentence 5 . We call this variable TIMELP. that a single member of the coalition holds, the lower is the variety of interests that the coalition must represent, and the smaller is the Pareto set of the coalition 8 . Therefore, the more concentrated is the government coalition, the higher is the probability that the government be able to change the legislative status quo. This index is distributed in the [0, 1] interval. It equals 1 in one-party majority parliamentary governments, while approaches 0 when the number of parties tends to infinity. Thus, the closer to 1 is HGOV, the more concentrated is the government coalition and the closer to its upper limit value is the Pareto set of the legislative veto players; and viceversa.
According to theory, a larger Pareto set endows the Constitutional Court with more possibilities to intervene. 6 We have also measured the distance between the date of the promulgation of the law and the date of the sentence, TIMELS. We prefer TIMELP first, because it is the President who chooses the laws to be reviewed and, second, because the time needed for the Court to render a sentence differs greatly from case to case. However, TIMELP and TIMELS are highly correlated (r = 0,9) and the estimates do not vary significantly when either of the two is included in the model. 7 To calculate this index, we sum the seats of the party i in the Chamber of Deputies and in the Senate, calculate the percentage s that these represent on the total number of seats held by the government coalition in the Parliament and compute the Herfindhal index:
where the superscript g is the total number of parties in government coalition. We have also considered the concentration of the opposition (HOP), as discussed in Padovano and Venturi (2001), but it never turned out statistically significant. 8 We have also tried a measure of ideological polarization of the Italian government coalitions, from Budge (1993, 1998) , but it never showed up statistically significant in the estimates. The likely explanation is that between 1948 and 1993 there has been no alternation in government of the two main parties: the Christian Democrats were always in the government and the Communist Party at the opposition. Parties were thus induced to follow opportunistic, rather than ideological, policies in their strategic interactions. Our measure of Court independence, the dependent variable, takes two forms. In the sentence based analyses, it is a matrix of three vectors of dummy variables S 1i, S 2i and S 3i that take the value of 1 if each sentence i is, respectively, of constitutional legitimacy, in parte qua (i.e., it declares the illegitimacy only of sections of a law and the legitimacy of other sections) or of constitutional illegitimacy, and 0 otherwise. The objects of the sentences are the laws approved by the legislative and executive branches, namely primary laws, legislative decrees and law-decrees. In the annual estimates, the variable, named ILLSENT t is the ratio of all sentences of constitutional illegitimacy on the total number of sentences of the Court for every year t. Since each judgment may contain a plurality of decisions, i.e. it can establish the legitimacy of a law and the illegitimacy of another, and the sentence in parte qua are in fact two decisions, in the annual analyses we enumerate ILLSENT t by taking into account all decisions that each sentence renders; thus, if a sentence contains three decisions, it is computed as three different sentences. We follow the literature in using the decisions about the constitutionality of the legislation because they modify the current legislation in a definitive manner and, by that, the equilibria between interest groups/voters and politicians based on such legislation. It must always be kept in mind that the executive and legislative branches must not have the Court declare a given law illegitimate if they want it to be abolished; lower cost courses of action for them are either to abolish the law directly or simply to pass another law that resolves differently. Hence, sentences of constitutional illegitimacy can be viewed as the tool in the hands of the Court to oppose the will of the other government bodies; in other words, to act independently from political interferences. The consideration of all types of sentences that the Court may render in reviewing legislation makes our analysis more adherent to reality; it also distinguishes our dependent variable from that of Santoni and Zucchini (2001) , who focus only on the sentences of constitutional illegitimacy. Truly, the Constitutional Court also has other means to innovate the legislative status quo, for example by rejecting a particular interpretation of the law through an interpretative sentence. Although they are an increasingly important and often-used instrument of jurisprudence, the interpretative sentences are more difficult (and arbitrary) to model as a variable; for these reasons we exclude them from our analysis. In order to provide a outlook of the dynamics of the dependent variable, Figure 3 We have tested the theories by means of two different estimating techniques: a multinomial logit model on sentence-based data, to account for the three types of sentences that the Court may promulgate, and maximum likelihood estimation on annual data where the dependent variable (the annual percentage of sentences of constitutional illegitimacy) has been censored between 0 and 100.
Several reasons suggest the use of two estimation procedures in this analysis. First, since some of the raw variables are available on a yearly basis (such as TIMELP and HGOV ) while others are originally sentence-based ( AGE, SHAREMAG, SHAREPRES, SHAREPARL and the dependent variable), we want to check whether the results are sensitive to the normalization adopted. Second, and more generally, the use of two estimating techniques provides a test of the robustness of the results. Third, on the one hand, the multinomial logit model yields estimates of the relationship between the dependent variable and the regressors using the most disaggregated observation level; 2267 observations in the sample are a guarantee of efficient estimates. On the other hand, the estimates on yearly data allow to test whether there is some continuity in the jurisprudence of the Court. Table I shows some descriptive statistics of the variables normalized on an annual basis. 4.2. Multinomial logit estimates. In order to exploit the full information of our sample -2.267
sentences and related observations -we estimate a multinomial logit model where the dependent variable is a 3×2267 matrix that takes the value of 1 in each column vector if the sentence is, respectively, of constitutional legitimacy, in parte qua or of constitutional illegitimacy and 0
otherwise. In this model the estimated coefficients indicate how each explanatory variable affects the probability to obtain each type of sentence, holding the other influences constant. The multinomial specification expands the explanatory power of the analysis with respect to empirical models that focus only on sentences of constitutional illegitimacy. The specification of the model is as follows:
where j=1, 2, 3 indicate the alternative forms of sentences, i is the number of decisions by the Court and k enumerates the regressors x (K=5 in the regressions illustrated below). Note that the parameters a are specific to each type of sentence, so there are j×k parameters in this specification.
However, the parameters are not all identified unless we impose normalization (Greene, 1997, chapter 19.7); we thus normalize the parameters of the first alternative (constitutional legitimacy) to be all zero: a 01 =a 11 =a 21 =0. The estimated coefficients on the second and third alternatives thus indicate incremental probabilities. Finally, x 1 relates to TIMELP, x 2 to SHAREMAG (or SHAREPRES or SHAREPARL, according to the model), x 3 to HGOV, x 4 to AGE and x 5 to SECREP.
The estimates are displayed in Table II . A first general result is that the probability the Court decides for illegitimacy (Log (P 3 /P 1 )) is broadly in line with the theory of Padovano, Sgarra and On the other hand, the coefficients on AGE are significant with the expected positive sign in both models. None of these regressors instead exerts a statistically significant influence on sentences in parte qua (Log (P 2 /P 1 )), which implies that the prediction of the theory are in fact specific to the decisions of the Court that signal a greater independence. The negative sign on SECREP suggests that the probability of obtaining sentences of constitutional illegitimacy has recently decreased. A possible rationale for this outcome is that the exceptional turnover in the political forces after 1993 has increased both the new legislative contracts between legislators and interest groups and the tendency of the Court to preserve the durability of these contracts, thus lowering the probability of sentences of illegitimacy.
The estimated coefficient on TIMELP is statistically significant but, being negative, contrasts with the Landes and Posner's (1975) predictions. A possible explanation may be that, especially in the early years, the Court had to focus on laws enacted before the promulgation of the 1948
Constitution, in order to ensure the consistency of the existing laws with the spirit of the new fundamental charter (Rodotà, 1999 (2) by maximum likelihood with the dependent variable censored between 0 and 100. The estimated coefficients in equation (2) are almost always consistent with the related theory.
Specifically, the coefficient on TIMELP is again negatively correlated to the dependent variable and is significant in all regression but Model 5, which features the share of presidential judges. first, the exceptional turnover in the political forces after 1993 has increased the new legislative contracts between legislators and interest groups; the Court tries to keep the durability of these contracts high by reducing the number of sentences of illegitimacy. A second possible explanation is that for most of this period the Court suffered from two to three vacancies, which decreased its output.
Concluding remarks
On the basis of the model of Padovano, Sgarra, Fiorino (2003) , this paper analyses which factors, if any, contribute to make the Italian Constitutional Court independent in his rulings so to effectively assure the functioning of the system of check and balances. The results of both sentence and annual based estimates point out that elements of structural independence, such as the presence of justices elected by the magistracy rather than other government branches, and the age of justices, as a proxy of their will to seek other official posts after their tenure, increase the independence of the Court. As a consequence, independence must not be considered as a constant characteristic, but a feature that changes according to the contingent relevance of these determinants. Moreover, the direct consideration of elements of structural independence shows that previous findings on the behavior of the Court, based on a single theory that measures independence in terms of the behavior of other political actors, are unsatisfactory.
Further research should focus on the changes of the behavior of the Court following major political and institutional transformations, such as those occurred in Italy in the early 1990s, should try to include a broader class of instruments of jurisprudence of the Court in the explanatory process and possibly look at the behavior of other institutions within the judicial branch of government.
